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In the landmark case of Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,' the
United States Supreme Court held that sexual harassment creating a hos-
tile work environment is prohibited employment discrimination under title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 The Court found that "Title VII is
not limited to 'economic' or 'tangible' discrimination,"' and held that the
intangible harms caused by harassment are sufficient to create a title VII
violation. Perhaps more importantly, the Court explicitly embraced the
lower Federal courts' development of the abusive or hostile work environ-
ment cause of action in title VII cases involving racial, national origin,
and religious discrimination."
In its June, 1989 opinion in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,6 the
Supreme Court again approved the hostile work environment cause of ac-
tion under title VII, and noted that title VII is the only Federal statutory
protection against such discrimination.6 Yet, while courts now recognize
the imperative of title VII liability for the intangible harms of employ-
ment discrimination, 7 their narrow construction of title VII's relief provi-
sions seriously undermines these findings. Courts have interpreted the
statute's remedial provisions to allow only equitable relief such as injunc-
1. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982).
3. 477 U.S. at 64.
4. Id. at 65-66.
5. 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
6. Id. at 2374, 2377. In Patterson the Court held that section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of
1866 does not cover racial harassment in the course of employment. See infra notes 57-60 and accom-
panying text.
7. Courts still differ as to the precise standards for determining employer liability for hostile work
environment discrimination, and much has been written on this subject. See, e.g., 1985-1986 Annual
Survey of Labor Relations and Employment Discrimination Law: Evidence Necessar
' 
to Establish a
Hostile Working Environment Claim: Erebia v. Chrysler Plastic Products Corp., 28 B.C.L. REV. 146
(1986); Note, Jailhouse Rocked: The Second Circuit Confronts a Racially Hostile Work Environment
in a Correctional Facility, 53 BROOKLYN L. REv. 357 (1987); Note, Employer Liability Under Title
VIfor Sexual Harassment After Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1258 (1987)
[hereinafter Note, Employer Liability]; Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environ-
ment Under Title VII, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1449 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Abusive Work Environ-
ment]; Note, Employer Liability for Coworker Sexual Harassment Under Title VII, 13 N.Y.U. REv.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 83 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Coworker Sexual Harassment].
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tions and reinstatement, and not compensatory or punitive damages. The
only monetary relief courts award under title VII is back pay, which is
considered an equitable remedy.' The psychological and other intangible
injuries that result from an abusive work environment are not compen-
sated. This result is inconsistent with the promise of title VII.
Ironically, this imbalance between rights and remedies reached a new
extreme soon after the Supreme Court in Patterson reaffirmed the critical
role of title VII in redressing hostile work environment discrimination.
Applying the narrow judicial construction of title VII's relief provisions,
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused even to hold an em-
ployer liable for hostile environment sexual harassment, despite the fact
that the plaintiff had proven her claim. The court concluded that "since
[the plaintiff] cannot recover any award under Title VII, [the employer]
must receive judgment even if there has been a violation of that statute."'
This outrageous result eviscerates the MeNtor Court's holding that "Title
VII is not limited to 'economic' or 'tangible' discrimination."10
This Note demonstrates that the abusive or hostile work environment
cause of action dramatically illustrates the inadequacy of the remedies
available under the current judicial interpretation of title VII. Although
this Note argues that compensatory and punitive damages should be avail-
able to remedy intangible injuries in any appropriate title VII case, 1 it
principally examines the hostile work environment cause of action, be-
cause title VII's coverage of psychological injuries was first recognized in
this context 2 and because this cause of action most clearly demonstrates
the existing imbalance between rights and remedies under title VII.
Further, this Note shows that Congress did not intend to create this
imbalance. Rather, the narrow judicial construction of title VII's relief
provisions derives from a misreading of the legislative history, com-
pounded by the courts' historical failure to recognize intangible injuries.
By the time employer liability for the intangible harms of discrimination
was established, courts considered it settled that compensatory and puni-
tive damages were unavailable under title VII to remedy these injuries.
This Note concludes that the imbalance between rights and remedies
under title VII must be cured by Congress, and that the time is ripe for
congressional action. The abundance of judicial precedents narrowly con-
8. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 197 (1974).
9. Swanson v. Elmhurst Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 882 F.2d 1235, 1240 (7th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 758 (1990).
10. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
11. Title VII cases generally fall into two categories: disparate treatment and disparate impact.
Disparate treatment cases involve an employee who is treated differently from other employees based
on her race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792 (1973). The latter type of cases involve facially neutral practices that have a "disparate impact"
on a protected class. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The hostile work environ-
ment cause of action does not fit neatly into either category.
12. See Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
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struing title VII's relief provisions indicates that a judicial solution is ex-
tremely unlikely. Congress must therefore restore to the statute the broad
remedial powers that were originally intended, by amending title VII to
provide explicitly for compensatory and punitive damages.' 3
I. RIGHTS WITHOUT REMEDIES
Employment discrimination frequently causes serious psychological
harm. As the Supreme Court has recognized, "[e]ven a temporary layoff
may have adverse . . . psychological effects."' 4 Yet under current judicial
interpretations of title VII, a victim of hostile work environment discrimi-
nation may establish employer liability, and yet obtain no relief at all
since the psychological and other intangible injuries that form the basis for
the employer's liability receive no compensation.' 5 Moreover, given the
lack of any sanction other than the finding of liability itself, such decisions
provide little deterrence against future discriminatory harassment. Conse-
quently, under title VII, many victims of hostile work environment dis-
crimination have been granted a right without a remedy.
A. Rights: The Hostile Work Environment Cause of Action
The hostile or abusive work environment cause of action under title VII
was first recognized by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Rog-
ers v. EEOC,'6 a national origin discrimination case. The hostile work
environment theory is based on the broad language of title VII, which
provides that it shall be unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire
or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.' 7 As Judge Goldberg stated in Rogers, this section
creates "an expansive concept which sweeps within its protective ambit
the practice of creating a working environment heavily charged with eth-
13. The opportunity for such legislation is currently present, since Congress is now considering
the Civil Rights Act of 1990 which includes a provision for compensatory and punitive damages under
title VII. See infra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
14. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 283 (1986) (plurality opinion).
15. At most, victims of hostile work environment discrimination receive attorneys' fees and a few
dollars of nominal damages. See, e.g., Swanson v. Elmhurst Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 882 F.2d 1235
(7th Cir. 1989) (finding sexual harassment but awarding no relief), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 758
(1990); Macko v. General Motors Corp., No. 80-CV-716 (N.D.N.Y. July 8, 1988), 1988 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6928, 1988 WL 73446 (finding sexual harassment but awarding only attorneys' fees and one
dollar in nominal damages); EEOC v. Murphy Motor Freight Lines, 488 F. Supp. 381 (D. Minn.
1980) (finding intervenor was victim of racial harassment but awarding only attorneys' fees); Comp-
ston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (finding religious harassment but awarding
only costs, attorneys' fees, and $50 of nominal damages). Even these minimal awards are controver-
sial. See infra note 50.
16. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
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nic or racial discrimination."' 8 Following Rogers, courts have applied the
hostile work environment theory in cases involving racial harassment, 9
religious harassment,20 and sexual harassment. 21
Under the hostile work environment cause of action, discriminatory
harassment violates title VII even if the employee does not suffer any eco-
nomic harm. As Rogers held, "employees' psychological as well as eco-
nomic fringes are statutorily entitled to protection from employer
abuse."22 As a result, an employee may suffer hostile work environment
discrimination even if she was not discriminatorily denied a promotion or
fired,23 and did not lose any wages or other economic job benefits.24
Rogers defined discriminatory harassment as conduct that creates an
atmosphere "so heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy com-
pletely the emotional and psychological stability of minority group work-
ers." 25  Similarly, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), the Federal agency charged with enforcing title VII,2 has de-
fined illegal harassment under the statute as actions which have the "pur-
pose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work per-
formance" or of "creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment. ' '27 Courts have generally accepted both the Rogers formula
and the EEOC guidelines.28 They have, however, added a requirement
that to establish a hostile work atmosphere, the employee must prove that
the harassment is "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions
of [the victim's] employment.' "29
18. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238.
19. See, e.g., Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 514-15 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1977).
20. See, e.g., Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157, 160-61 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
21. See, e.g., Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943-45 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
22. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238.
23. In some abusive environment cases, although the employee was not fired, the harassment may
have resulted in a "constructive discharge" which courts treat like a firing. Even when the harassment
does not amount to a constructive discharge, however, the employer may still be found liable for
discriminatory harassment. See, e.g., Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 638 (6th Cir. 1987) (finding
no constructive discharge, but still holding employer liable for hostile environment sexual harassment).
24. See, e.g., Snell v. Suffolk County, 611 F. Supp. 521 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding plaintiffs failed
to establish claim of disparate treatment in job assignments, but holding employer liable for racial
harassment), affd, 782 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir. 1986).
25. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1982).
27. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1989) (defining sexual harassment); 29 C.F.R. § 1606.8(b) (1989)
(identical language used to define harassment on the basis of national origin).
28. See, e.g., Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-66 (1986) (accepting both definitions
and finding them consistent with each other). Courts still disagree, however, over the standards for
when an employer will be held liable for such discriminatory harassment. In Meritor, the Supreme
Court refused to resolve this debate in the circuits, although it did reject both absolute liability and a
requirement of actual knowledge. For any further guidance, the Court simply referred the lower
courts to general agency principles. 477 U.S. at 69-72; see also Note, Employer Liability, supra note
7, at 1259-65 (discussing various liability standards adopted by courts).
29. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir.
1982)); accord Snell v. Suffolk County, 782 F.2d 1094, 1103 (2d Cir. 1986); Gilbert v. City of Little
Rock, 722 F.2d 1390, 1394 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 972 (1984).
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The emotional, psychological, and physiological injuries caused by dis-
criminatory harassment practices can be devastating.30 Victims of hostile
work environment discrimination frequently suffer from psychological
symptoms such as stress, nervousness, and depression, as well as physical
symptoms including nausea, insomnia, headaches, and loss of appetite."'
Employers should be, and in most cases are, held liable under title VII for
causing or permitting such harm to their employees.32 However, the de-
terrent and remedial effects of a finding of liability are often nonexistent
due to the strict limitations on available relief.
B. Remedies: The Inadequacy of Relief Under Title VII
Under current judicial interpretations, the only remedies provided by
title VII are attorneys' fees and equitable relief such as back pay, 33 in-
junctions, and reinstatement; no compensatory or punitive damages are
awarded to redress non-economic injuries. 4 Several courts have noted that
were they available, compensatory and punitive damages could play a vi-
tal role in remedying the harms caused by employment discrimination. 5
30. The most extensive studies of these non-economic job related injuries have been conducted in
the context of sexual harassment. See, e.g., C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN 47-55 (1979); U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: AN UPDATE (1988). For a thorough discussion of studies on the origins and
intractability of racial harassment, see Snell v. Suffolk County, 611 F. Supp. 521, 529-31 (E.D.N.Y.
1985), ajd, 782 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir. 1986).
31. See, e.g., C. MACKINNON, supra note 30, at 47-48 (78% of sexual harassment victims in one
study suffered from emotional or physical symptoms); Crull, Stress Effects of Sexual Harassment on
the Job: hnplicationsfor Counseling, 52 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 539, 541 (1982) (90% of sexual
harassment victims in study suffered from listed psychological stress symptoms; 63% of one group and
20% of another suffered from listed physical symptoms). A study of Federal Government workers
found that during the two years from 1985 to 1987, 12,641 Federal employees sought medical assis-
tance, emotional counseling, or both as a result of sexual harassment. U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTEC-
TION BOARD, supra note 30, at 41. For compelling examples, see infra notes 46-54 and accompany-
ing text.
32. But see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
33. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., Pearson v. Western Elec. Co., 542 F.2d 1150, 1152 (10th Cir. 1976); EEOC v.
Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301, 308-09 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 431 U.S. 951
(1977). The purpose of a compensatory damages award is to provide a monetary substitute to com-
pensate a plaintiff for non-economic losses that may nonetheless be measured in monetary terms. D.
DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.1 (1973). Punitive damages are designed both as
a punishment for, and as a deterrent to, "particularly aggravated misconduct on the part of the de-
fendant." Id. § 3.9, at 204. Punitive damages are also viewed as having a compensatory component, at
least insofar as they compensate the plaintiff for her wounded feelings. Id. § 3.9, at 205.
35. See, e.g., Beesley v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 723 F. Supp. 635, 647 (N.D. Ala. 1989) (without
compensatory and punitive damages "a Title VII sexual harassment claim, as a practical matter, [is]
meaningless"); Macko v. General Motors Corp., No. 80-CV-716 (N.D.N.Y. July 8, 1988), 1988 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6928, 1988 WL 73446 ("remedial shortcomings of Title VII" limited relief for sexual
harassment victim to "a mere $1 in nominal damages"); Stewart v. Thomas, 538 F. Supp. 891, 897
(D.D.C. 1982) ("To the extent that Title VII fails to capture the personal nature of the injury done
to this plaintiff as an individual, the remedies provided by that statute fail to appreciate the relevant
dimensions of the problem in this [sexual harassment] case."); Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F.
Supp. 157, 162 (S.D. Ohio 1976) ("Were compensatory damages available to a Title VII plaintiff,
this Court would not hesitate to enter such an award in this [religious harassment] case .... ").
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The courts, however, have generally considered such damages to be legal
remedies, 6 and have held that title VII provides for only equitable relief.
This judicial consensus was developed in the mid-1970's. Ten years af-
ter the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Federal courts were
split as to the availability of damages under title VII.3 7 Several courts had
found that compensatory and punitive damages were available,3" and one
court had actually awarded punitive damages to a title VII plaintiff. " In
the spring of 1975, however, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
overturned that award in EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co.,40 and became the
first circuit court to hold that such damages are not available under title
VII. Shortly thereafter, other circuit courts employed the same arguments
to deny compensatory and punitive damages.41 Today courts simply state
summarily that compensatory and punitive damages are unavailable.42
Without compensatory and punitive damages, title VII is stripped of its
power to remedy the harms of hostile work environment discrimination.
As one court stated in a sexual harassment case, "[t]o the extent that Title
VII fails to capture the personal nature of the injury done to th[e] plaintiff
as an individual, the remedies provided by that statute fail to appreciate
the relevant dimensions of the problem."43 Back pay, reinstatement, or
any other equitable relief that courts will award today under title VII
cannot compensate for psychological and emotional injuries. Although in-
junctions are available to prevent recurrences of abusive behavior, the em-
ployee may be in no condition to return and benefit from the improved
working environment.44 Moreover, the lack of punitive damages means
that there is little deterrent value to a finding of liability for a hostile
work environment.
45
36. D. DOBBS, supra note 34, §§ 3.1, 3.9.
37. Comment, Implying Punitive Damages in Employment Discrimination Cases, 9 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 325, 326 (1974).
38. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Southwestern Portland Cement Co., 369 F. Supp. 832 (W.D. Tex.
1973) (holding compensatory damages available), rev'd on other grounds, 488 F.2d 691 (5th Cir.
1974); Tooles v. Kellogg Co., 336 F. Supp. 14 (D. Neb. 1972) (holding punitive damages available).
39. Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co., 365 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Mich. 1973), rev'd sub norm. EEOC v.
Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 431 U.S. 951 (1977).
40. 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 431 U.S. 951 (1977).
41. See, e.g., Richerson v. Jones, 551 F.2d 918 (3d Cir. 1977) (denying punitive damages); Pear-
son v. Western Elec. Co., 542 F.2d 1150 (10th Cir. 1976) (denying both compensatory and punitive
damages).
42. See, e.g., Glezos v. Amalfi Ristorante Italiano, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 1271, 1273 (D. Md. 1987);
Robinson v. City of Lake Station, 630 F. Supp. 1052, 1064 (N.D. Ind. 1986). But see Beesley v.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 723 F. Supp. 635, 652 (N.D. Ala. 1989) (finding "the question of entitlement
to punitive damages under Title VII . . . is still open").
43. Stewart v. Thomas, 538 F. Supp. 891, 897 (D.D.C. 1982).
44. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Shoe Show of Va., Inc., 678 F. Supp. 1241, 1243 (S.D. W. Va. 1988)
(victim of racial and sexual harassment rejected defendant's offer of reinstatement, saying she "'would
never work for them again' "); Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 44 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 37,485, at
49,377 (N.D. I1. 1987) ("reinstatement would be inappropriate" because victim of sexual harassment
"suffered a phobic reaction to the company"), affd in relevant part, 881 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1989).
45. As one court recently stated, "allowing nothing beyond 'nominal damages' for a series of
uninvited sexual assaults, even without any accompanying demotion or discharge, would render a
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Several cases clearly illustrate the results of this imbalance between
rights and remedies."' For example, in Compston v. Borden, Inc.,"7 a re-
ligious harassment case, the court found that the plaintiff had been the
victim of "numerous derogatory epithets and . . . a patterned course of
conduct designed to make his working environment a miserable one," but
that he had not suffered any economic harm." The court noted that
"[w]ere compensatory damages available to a Title VII plaintiff, this
Court would not hesitate to enter such an award in this case, because it is
apparent from the evidence that Compston suffered mental anguish and
humiliation at defendants' hands."4 In an effort to give some minimal
relief, the court awarded nominal damages of fifty dollars.5 0
Similarly, in the sexual harassment case of Zabkowicz v. West Bend
Co.,51 the court found that the plaintiff had been subjected to four years of
"sustained, malicious, and brutal harassment" that was "more than
merely unreasonable; it was malevolent and outrageous. ' 52 Indeed, four
years of egregious verbal abuse, offensive physical gestures, and demean-
ing sexually oriented drawings of herself had caused Mrs. Zabkowicz to
suffer from "diarrhea, vomiting, severe nausea, and cramping," which
was diagnosed as " 'psychophysiological gastro-intestinal disease due to
harassment at work.'-"3 The only economic injury to Mrs. Zabkowicz,
however, was the loss of two months' pay due to a medical leave of ab-
sence her illness had required her to take. As a result, the only remedy
awarded was two months of back pay. 54
C. The Inadequacy and Impropriety of Alternative Remedies
Given the lack of damages remedies under title VII, many victims of
discriminatory harassment have turned to other potential sources of relief.
Although in some cases these alternative approaches have been successful,
they are of limited and diminishing availability. Until recently, victims of
racial harassment were often able to obtain compensatory and punitive
damages by appending a claim under section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act
Title VII sexual harassment claim, as a practical matter, meaningless." Beesley, 723 F. Supp. at 647.
46. See C. NEWKIRK, E. VARGYAS & M. GREENBERGER, TITLE VII's FAILED PROMISE: THE
IMPACT OF THE LACK OF A DAMAGES REMEDY 10-23 (1990) (Report by National Women's Law
Center) (discussing many such cases).
47. 424 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
48. Id. at 160.
49. Id. at 162.
50. Id. Courts disagree over whether nominal damages may be awarded under title VII to create
a remedy upon which to attach an award of costs and attorneys' fees. Compare Henson v. City of
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905-06 (11th Cir. 1982) (nominal damages may be awarded) with Bohen v.
City of East Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180, 1184 (7th Cir. 1986) (nominal damages not available).
51. 589 F. Supp. 780 (E.D. Wis. 1984).
52. Id. at 784.
53. Id. at 783 (quoting doctor's diagnosis).
54. Id. at 785. In a separate proceeding, the Seventh Circuit held that she was also entitled to
attorneys' fees. Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 789 F.2d 540, 554 (7th Cir. 1986).
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of 1866, a Reconstruction-era statute prohibiting racial discrimination
that impedes the right "to make and enforce contracts."' 5  Although the
Court had held in 1976 that section 1981 applies to private conduct," the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union 7
foreclosed this avenue of relief. In Patterson, the Court construed section
1981 extremely narrowly and held that claims of racial harassment are
not actionable under this statute.58 The impact of the Patterson decision
has been dramatic; during the first four and one-half months after the
opinion was issued twenty-two racial harassment cases were dismissed.59
Ironically, the Patterson Court relied on the availability of title VII reme-
dies in holdihg that section 1981 does not cover racial harassment.60
The alternative sources for relief in sexual harassment cases are also
problematic. Some sexual harassment victims have recovered compensa-
tory damages under state civil rights statutes,6 ' or through an equal pro-
tection claim under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. 62 But
few states have enacted statutes banning sexual harassment, and section
1983 applies only to state employers.6" In addition, section 1983 requires
proof of discriminatory intent, 4 and thereby prohibits holding the em-
ployer vicariously liable for sexual harassment by a co-worker.6 5
In general, victims of sexual harassment must rely on a variety of inad-
equate tort remedies to obtain any compensation for their psychological
and other intangible injuries.65 The tort theories used by such plaintiffs
include assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, in-
55. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982); see, e.g., Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417 (7th Cir.
1986) (upholding award of $25,000 compensatory damages and $25,000 punitive damages for racial
harassment under section 1981); Erebia v. Chrysler Plastic Products Corp., 772 F.2d 1250 (6th Cir.
1985) (upholding award of $30,000 punitive damages under section 1981 for racial harassment), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1015 (1986).
56. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
57. 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
58. Id. at 2374.
59. Marcus, Ruling Said to Spur Dismissal of Bias Suits, Washington Post, Nov. 20, 1989, at
A6, col. 3.
60. 109 S. Ct. at 2375 ("That egregious racial harassment of employees is forbidden by a clearly
applicable law (Title VII), moreover, should lessen the temptation for this Court to twist the interpre-
tation of another statute (§ 1981) to cover the same conduct.").
61. See, e.g., Coley v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 561 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (awarding
sexual harassment victim $5,000 damages for mental anguish and humiliation under Michigan's Elli-
ott-Larsen Civil Rights Act); see also Note, Legal Remedies for Employment-Related Sexual Harass-
ment, 64 MINN. L. REV. 151 (1979) (proposing model state statute prohibiting sexual harassment).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982); see, e.g., Bohen v. City of East Chicago, 666 F. Supp. 154 (N.D.
Ind. 1987) (awarding sexual harassment victim $25,000 for mental distress and $4,150 for medical
expenses under section 1983 claim), enforcing 799 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding equal protec-
tion claim for sexual harassment actionable under section 1983).
63. See Bohen v. City of East Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180, 1185 (7th Cir. 1986).
64. Id. at 1186.
65. Dworkin, Ginger & Mallor, Theories of Recovery for Sexual Harassment: Going Beyond
Title VII, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 125, 135-36 (1988).
66. See Comment, A Theory of Tort Liability for Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 134 U.
PA. L. REV. 1461 (1986) (arguing that traditional tort theories are inadequate and proposing new tort
cause of action).
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vasion of privacy, and intentional interference with contract.17 These
causes of action, however, vary widely from state to state and "[n]o single
rubric provides adequate relief."68 An additional barrier to any tort recov-
ery is the tort doctrine of respondeat superior, under which an employer
may be held vicariously liable for the torts of her employees only when
the torts are committed in furtherance of their employment. This doctrine
has often been used to deny relief for discriminatory harassment by co-
workers, and to limit tort recovery to situations in which the employer has
authorized the discriminatory mistreatment.69
Not only are these alternative causes of action wholly inadequate in
providing uniform, reliable, or adequate relief, but more importantly, al-
ternative paths should not be necessary to provide complete relief to vic-
tims of employment discrimination. Congress intended that title VII serve
as a comprehensive Federal tool to "eliminate, through the utilization of
formal and informal remedial procedures, discrimination in employ-
ment."17 0 Thus, the need to resort to external causes of action contravenes
the spirit and goals of title VII.
II. THE DERIVATION OF THE IMBALANCE
The legislative history of title VII's relief provisions, although limited,
indicates that Congress intended to provide courts with broad discretion to
award any type of remedy that is appropriate in a given case. Conse-
quently, amending title VII to provide explicitly for compensatory and
punitive damages, would, by invalidating the courts' unduly narrow read-
ing of title VII, restore the statute to its originally intended role.71
The courts' refusal to adopt a broad approach to remedies under title
VIP 2 essentially stems from two sources. First, the courts improperly con-
67. See Dworkin, Ginger & Mallor, supra note 65, at 137-46 (describing these tort causes of
action for sexual harassment).
68. Comment, supra note 66, at 1484-85. For example, although the Washington, D.C. courts
have broadly defined the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress to include some cases of
hostile environment sexual harassment, the standard is significantly more demanding than that under
title VII. See Howard Univ. v. Best, 484 A.2d 958, 986 (D.C. 1984) (holding sexual harassment
constitutes intentional infliction of emotional distress only if conduct was "'so outrageous in character,
and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency'" (citation omitted)).
69. See Note, Abusive Work Environment, supra note 7, at 1464. Vicarious liability is absolutely
necessary to remove harassment from the workplace. Only the employer has sufficient control to alter
the work atmosphere by, for example, disciplining employees who create a discriminatory work envi-
ronment. See generally Note, Coworker Sexual Harassment, supra note 7 (arguing employers should
be vicariously liable for sexual harassment of their employees by coworkers).
70. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 2391, 2401. The development of a variety of state law and other external causes of action
further erodes the effectiveness of title VII as a comprehensive Federal anti-discrimination weapon.
71. The "restoration" concept was the theory behind the Civil Rights Restoration Act, Pub. L.
No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988). That act overturned the Supreme Court's decision in Grove City
College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984), which had construed too narrowly the scope of the protections
against sex discrimination provided by title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-318, 86 Stat. 235, 373.
72. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
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strued title VII's legislative history. Second, the courts' interpretation of
title VII was formed prior to their recognition of the hostile work environ-
ment cause of action and the appropriateness of compensatory and puni-
tive damages under title VII.
A. Improper Statutory Interpretation
In 1972, Congress passed the Equal Employment Opportunity Act73 to
amend various provisions of title VII, including section 706(g), which de-
lineates the relief available under the Act. The legislative history sur-
rounding the. amendment of section 706 (g) is extremely limited, and there
is no evidence in the Act, the amendments, or the legislative history that
Congress ever explicitly considered whether compensatory or punitive
damages should be awarded under title VII.74 Nonetheless, a proper read-
ing of title VII and its legislative history demonstrates that the statute's
relief provisions should be construed broadly. Under well established
principles of statutory construction, courts must look first to the language
of a statute,17 and the language of section 706(g) is expansive.76 More-
over, compensatory and punitive damages have been awarded under sev-
eral statutes that do not explicitly provide for such relief." As one com-
mentator has argued, "[t]here is nothing new . . . in federal courts'
implying the availability of remedies that are not explicitly provided by a
particular statute. The theory is that 'the existence of a statutory right
implies the existence of all necessary and appropriate remedies.' "8 This
policy is especially sound where the additional remedy is needed to fulfill
the purpose of the statute. 9 This rationale clearly applies in the context
of title VII.
The courts, however, have misread the statutory language of section
706(g) and have consequently refused to infer the existence of compensa-
tory and punitive damages under title VII. The case that was most influ-
ential in establishing this narrow judicial interpretation of title VII was
Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp.,"0 an opinion by the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of California. The Van Hoomissen
opinion provided arguments that were employed as each circuit in turn
73. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972).
74. See Richards, Compensatory and Punitive Damages in Emplo ment Discrimination Cases, 27
ARK. L. REV. 603, 618 (1973).
75. See Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980); Tello
v. McMahon, 677 F. Supp. 1436, 1441 (E.D. Cal. 1938).
76. See infra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
77. These statutes include section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982),
and section 404(b) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1982). See Comment,
supra note 37, at 332-33.
78. Comment, supra note 37, at 331 (quoting Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S.
229, 239 (1969)).
79. See id. at 333.
80. 368 F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
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denied the availability of compensatory and punitive damages under title
VII.8L The Van Hoomissen court arrived at its decision through statutory
construction, an examination of the legislative history, and a comparison
of title VII with two other statutes. None of the court's rationales is per-
suasive; in fact, each is fundamentally flawed.82
1. Statutory Construction
The Van Hoomissen court's weakest rationale for its decision stems
from its statutory construction of section 706(g). The Van Hoomissen
court stated that a court may infer the availability of damages when a
statute "speaks only in the most general of remedial terms," but when
several specific remedies are listed, no such inference may be drawn."
However, the court's conclusion that Congress intended to restrict the
types of remedies available under title VII to those specifically listed in
section 706(g) belies the statutory language Congress chose to employ.
Congress provided in section 706(g) that courts may "enjoin the .. .
unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may
be appropriate." 4 The language "such affirmative action as may be ap-
propriate" confers great flexibility on the courts and could easily be inter-
preted to encompass both legal and equitable relief.8 5 The remaining lan-
guage of section 706(g) further indicates that Congress intended to provide
complete relief under title VII. In amending the statute in 1972, Congress
added two phrases to section 706(g)'s list of specifically authorized reme-
dies: "but is not limited to" at the beginning of the list and "or any other
equitable relief as the court deems appropriate" at the end. The resulting
section authorizes courts to "order such affirmative action as may be ap-
propriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hir-
ing of employees, with or without back pay ...or any other equitable
relief as the court deems appropriate.'8 6 As courts have noted, the latter
phrase indicates that the specifically listed remedies of "reinstatement or
81. See, e.g., Harrington v. Vandalia-Butler Bd. of Educ., 585 F.2d 192, 194-97 (6th Cir. 1978).
(holding compensatory damages unavailable), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 932 (1979); Richerson v. Jones,
551 F.2d 918, 926-28 (3d Cir. 1977) (denying availability of punitive damages); Pearson v. Western
Elec. Co., 542 F.2d 1150, 1151-52 (10th Cir. 1976) (denying both compensatory and punitive dam-
ages); Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363, 1368-71
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (same).
82. For an early critique of the Van Hoomissen court's analysis, which forms the groundwork for
several of the arguments that follow, see Comment, supra note 37, at 337-45.
83. Van Hoomissen, 368 F. Supp. at 838.
84. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
85. Moreover, Congress had not employed this specific phrase in any prior statute. Thus, not only
does the actual statutory language resoundingly invite a broad construction, but the courts were com-
pletetly free from potentially constraining precedent. The closest language is that of the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which authorizes "such affirmative action . . . as will effectuate the
policies of this subchapter." 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982). This language is more constraining than title
VII's open-ended phrase "as may be appropriate." For a further discussion of the NLRA comparison,
see infra notes 96-109 and accompanying text.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982) (italics indicate language added by 1972 amendments).
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hiring of employees, with or without back pay" are considered to be equi-
table relief, and that courts could use wide discretion in fashioning other
equitable remedies.87 Commentators have long recognized that remedies
beyond equitable relief may be available since the first phrase, "but is not
limited to," is an expansive one.88
The 1972 amendments, however, support an even stronger claim. More
specifically, had Congress only intended to broaden the equitable relief
available under title VII, it would have been sufficient to add the "or any
other equitable relief" clause at the end of section 706(g)'s list of reme-
dies. Instead, Congress simultaneously added the phrase "but is not lim-
ited to" as part of the 1972 amendments. Despite the significance of this
phrase, the courts' current construction of section 706(g) renders it a nul-
lity, thereby violating fundamental principles of statutory construction.8"
The phrase "but is not limited to" modifies the entire list of specified
remedies, including the term "any other equitable relief." Consequently,
if the relief is "not limited to" the whole range of available equitable
remedies, section 706(g) must also permit awards of legal relief such as
compensatory and punitive damages. Had the Van Hoomissen court ana-
lyzed the "but is not limited to" clause, it should have concluded that
Congress, unwilling and unable to predict the full extent of "appropriate"
relief under title VII, deliberately left open the possibility of legal relief
under title VII. The court's error has been perpetuated as courts follow-
ing Van Hoomissen have also ignored this critical phrase.90
2. Legislative History
The Van Hoomissen court's analysis of title VII's legislative history is
similarly flawed. The court focused on outdated legislative history from
section 706(g)'s original enactment in 1964 and irrelevant legislative his-
tory regarding the 1972 amendments to other provisions of title VII 1 As
the court correctly noted, however, the legislative history of the current
version of section 706(g) itself is quite limited.92 Indeed, the Joint Ex-
planatory Statement of Managers included in the Conference Report for
the 1972 amendments simply indicates that the Senate accepted the House
version of section 706(g).93
87. See, e.g., EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301, 309 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated on other
grounds, 431 U.S. 951 (1977).
88. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 37, at 337; Note, Coworker Sexual Harassment, supra note
7, at 111.
89. See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979) (holding that "in construing a
statute [courts] are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word Congress used").
90. See, e.g., Richerson v. Jones, 551 F.2d 918, 928 (3d Cir. 1977) (asserting that in 1972 "Con-
gress merely added a provision which permitted courts to award 'any other equitable relief as the
court deems appropriate.' ").
91. Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 368 F. Supp. 829, 836-37 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
92. Id. at 836.
93. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 899, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
(Vol. 99: 16111622
1990] Title VII Remedies 1623
Although the Van Hoomissen court did quote one of the few
paragraphs on section 706(g) from the 1972 debates,94 it failed to explain
how it concluded from this brief passage that Congress intended to deny
compensatory and punitive damages to title VII plaintiffs.95 The quoted
language is extremely broad and vague, and neither it nor anything else in
the legislative history indicates that Congress intended to circumscribe in
any way the types of relief available under title VII.
3. Comparisons with Other Statutes
The Van Hoomissen court also attempted to bolster its interpretation of
title VII's relief provisions through comparisons with those of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (NLRA)96 and the Fair Housing Act,9 7 but
these arguments are also weak. Under the NLRA rationale, the court
pointed out that the relief provisions of title VII were modeled on those of
the NLRA, which had already been held not to provide for compensatory
or punitive damages.98 The relief provisions of title VII, however, were
never identical to those of the NLRA and were significantly broadened in
1972." Indeed, Congress' insertion of the phrase "but is not limited to"
before the list of specific remedies authorized under title VII suggests that
Congress specifically intended to enlarge title VII relief beyond that pro-
vided under the NLRA.
In addition, despite the remaining similarity in language between the
relief provisions of title VII and the NLRA, the remedial goals of the two
statutes are fundamentally different.1 00 Whereas the NLRA seeks to pro-
ADMIN. NEws 2137, 2179, 2183.
94. Van Hoonissen, 368 F. Supp. at 837. The language, however, does not appear on the cited
page of the Congressional Record. It seems to have been taken from a section-by-section analysis of
the bill prepared by two Senators. See 118 CONG. REc. 7166, 7168 (daily ed. March 6, 1972).
95. After quoting the language, the court first noted that its ambiguity "has been a source of
confusion among the district courts," and in its next sentence asserted that "the general legislative
history . . . indicates that the remedies intended were those [specifically] provided for" in section
706(g). Van Hoomissen, 368 F. Supp. at 837.
96. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b)-(c) (1982).
97. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3613(c) (West Supp. 1989).
98. Van Hoonissen, 368 F. Supp. at 837. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S.
197, 235-36 (1938) (no punitive damages under NLRA).
99. See supra note 85. Compare section 10(c) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982) with
section 706(g) of title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
100. Moreover, the NLRA comparision is inapposite because the NLRA and title VII differ sub-
stantially in their enforcement mechanisms. See Comment, supra note 37, at 342-43. Under the
NLRA, relief is provided by an administrative agency, the National Labor Relations Board, 29
U.S.C. § 160(a)-(c) (1982), a fact that influenced the Supreme Court's holding that no punitive
damages are available under the NLRA. See Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 11 (1940)
(finding that Congress could not have "intended to vest in the Board a virtually unlimited discretion to
devise punitive measures"). Under title VII, by contrast, even though cases are initially reviewed by
an administrative agency, the EEOC, it is only authorized to attempt a resolution through "informal
methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982). Relief under
title VII is provided by the courts, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982), which are clearly capable of
awarding damages.
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mote industrial peace' °' and is designed essentially as a group remedy," 2
title VII strives to end all employment discrimination and to relieve the
injuries of individual victims.'0 3 For example, under the NLRA, discrim-
inatory discharges of active union members violate the Act not because of
their adverse effects on the fired employees, but because the discharges
chill the unionism of the remaining employees.104 Consequently, the vic-
tims of the discharge are the remaining workers, and the remedy of rein-
statement is implemented primarily as a means to protect their rights of
self-organization, and only secondarily as a method of compensating those
who were actually fired.' 0 5 Compensatory damages are therefore unneces-
sary, since the remaining employees will not generally have suffered the
type or degree of intangible injuries that such damages are designed to
redress. Punitive damages are also inappropriate, since they would
counter the statutory goal of promoting industrial peace.'0 6
Title VII, by contrast, concerns itself with the fired employees, and
"the basic policy of the statute requires that [courts] focus on fairness to
individuals rather than fairness to classes."' 07 Although an employer's dis-
criminatory practices may affect employees on a classwide basis, title VII
remedies are designed "to make persons whole for injuries suffered on
account of unlawful employment discrimination. "'O Therefore, the reme-
dial goals of title VII would be furthered by compensatory damages to
redress individuals' intangible injuries. Furthermore, unlike the NLRA's
overarching goal of promoting industrial peace, "the primary objective [of
title VII i]s a prophylactic one,"'09 and punitive damages would further
this objective by deterring future discrimination.
The Van Hoomissen court also compared title VII to the Fair Housing
Act of title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, which specifically pro-
vides for punitive damages." 0 The court concluded that had Congress in-
101. NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 401-02 (1952).
102. Local Union No. 12, Progressive Mine Workers v. NLRB, 189 F.2d 1, 5 (7th Cir.), cert
denied, 342 U.S. 868 (1951).
103. Between the original drafting of section 706(g) and the ultimate enactment of title VII in
1964, Congress shifted its theory of title VII from a "public right" to a "private right" of action. See
Comment, Enforcement of Fair Employment Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 32 U. CHI. L. REv.
430, 466 (1965). Consequently, title VII was enacted in 1964 as a private rights statute with only the
language of a public rights statute.
104. See Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 275-76 (1965).
105. For example, under the Supreme Court's approach in Darlington, the victims of a discrimi-
natory plant closing were not the union members who had lost their jobs, but the employees at the
remaining plants who would perceive the closing as a threat. Id.
106. See Claiborne v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 401 F. Supp. 1022, 1024-25 (E.D. La. 1975) (arguing
that while the NLRA would be undermined by punitive damages, title VII would not be), modied,
583 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 934 (1979).
107. Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 709 (1978).
108. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975).
109. Id. at 417.
110. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3613(c) (West Supp. 1989). The provision analyzed by the Van Hoomi.sen
court provided that courts could award "actual damages. and not more than $1000 punitive damages."
42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1982). This was the original relief provision. Congress only recently removed
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tended to allow such damages under title VII, it would have drafted simi-
larly explicit language. However, the fact that Congress did not add a
similar provision to title VII when amending that statute in 1972 tells us
Very little. As one commentator has pointed out, the Van Hoomissen court
based its argument that the comparison to the Fair Housing Act was "il-
luminating" '111 on a mistaken notion: that the Fair Housing Act was
passed as part of an amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, so that
the Fair Housing Act and title VII had become part of the same Act. 1 2
Significantly, in EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co.,"' the first circuit court
to hold that punitive damages are unavailable under title VII made the
same error. It stated that the Fair Housing Act was "Title VIII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 [which] was amended in 1968" to provide for
punitive damages, and concluded that since Congress had "set forth with
such particularity the remedies permitted under the portion of the Civil
Rights Act relating to discrimination in housing," the lack of such a provi-
sion in title VII was significant.1 4 However, although the Fair Housing
Act is also called "title VIII," it is title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of
1968, not the next title sequentially after title VII in the 1964 Act.'15
Indeed, Congress never considered these two statutes together, since it
passed the Fair Housing Act four years after the enactment of title VII
and four years before title VII was amended." 6 As other courts followed
Van Hoomissen and Detroit Edison in holding that punitive and compen-
this cap on damages as part of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102
Stat. 1619, 1633. The Act now provides simply that "the court may award to the plaintiff actual and
punitive damages." 42 U.S.C.A. § 3613(c) (West Supp. 1989).
111. Van Hoonissen, 368 F. Supp. at 837.
112. Comment, supra note 37, at 339. The author notes that in the original published version of
the opinion, the court actually referred to the two statutes as "part of the same 1964 Civil Rights
Act." This phrase was removed from the version currently printed in the Federal Supplement. Id.
113. 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 431 U.S. 951 (1977).
114. Id. at 309.
115. The actual title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is entitled "Registration and Voting
Statistics" and provides that voting statistics shall be compiled by race and national origin to ensure
that registered voters do indeed vote. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 266.
116. One might argue that title VII and the Fair Housing Act are nonetheless both anti-
discrimination statutes with similar structures, and therefore it is still instructive to compare the af-
firmative mention of punitive damages in the Fair Housing Act with the absence of such a term in
title VII. However, the lesson one may learn from this comparison is that punitive damages were
presumptively available under both statutes, and the specific provision in the Fair Housing Act was
intended to delimit an otherwise unfettered right to such damages. The provision of the Fair Housing
Act to which the Van Hoomissen court referred was the original relief section, see supra note 110,
which provided that a "court may grant as relief, as it deems appropriate. . . actual damages and not
nore than S1000 punitive damages." 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1982) (emphasis added). In construing this
language, at least one Federal court of appeals held that under the Fair Housing Act "[tihe statutory
provisions relating to punitive damages do not create a new right and are designed to limit the amount
of recovery to $1,000 where punitive damages are found to be appropriate.'. Steele v. Title Realty
Co., 478 F.2d 380, 384 (10th Cir. 1973) (emphasis added); see also Richards, supra note 74, at 618.
Under this interpretation, Congress, by its failure to adopt a similar provision in title VII, left the
availability of damages intact; no affirmative mention of such damages was necessary.
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satory damages are unavailable under title VII, they repeated the Fair
Housing Act argument without detecting this critical error.
117
Despite the weaknesses of the Van Hoomissen court's analysis, courts
have continued to rely on its arguments and to follow its holding. Indeed,
since the Sixth Circuit overturned the Detroit Edison district court's
award of punitive damages,118 no award of compensatory or punitive
damages under title VII has withstood an appeal.1
B. Timing
In addition to relying on improper statutory interpretation, courts have
limited title VII remedies because their construction of the statute's relief
provisions was fixed before they recognized the need for and "appropri-
ateness" of compensatory and punitive damages under title VII. During
the early 1970's, the Rogers v. EEOC court was the only circuit court to
recognize the hostile work environment theory and hold that "employees'
psychological as well as economic fringes are statutorily entitled to protec-
tion from employer abuse."1 0 Indeed, four years after the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Rogers, the Supreme Court still maintained the narrow view
that "Title VII deals with legal injuries of an economic character.1 21
Moreover, courts did not yet understand the subtle and pervasive charac-
ter of employment discrimination and the consequent need for the deter-
rent of punitive damages.
Even several years after Rogers, most courts incorrectly believed that
title VII only covered tangible, economic harms. This pervasive view was
well captured in a law review article widely cited during this time, which
stated that under title VII, "[e]ssentially the only uncompensated elements
of damage, therefore, are the psychological injuries-for instance, humili-
ation and mental suffering. To go so far as to imply a compensatory dam-
age remedy solely for this type of injury would be of doubtful propriety
..1."22 This common misperception was not corrected until after the
law had become settled that compensatory and punitive damages were un-
117. See, e.g., Richerson v. Jones, 551 F.2d 918, 927-28 (3d Cir. 1977) (denying punitive dam-
ages); Pearson v. Western Elec. Co., 542 F.2d 1150, 1152 (10th Cir. 1976) (denying both compensa-
tory and punitive damages); Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp.
1363, 1370 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (same).
118. Stamps v. Detroit Edison, 365 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Mich. 1973), rezvd sub norn. EEOC v.
Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975), ,acated on other grounds, 431 U.S. 951 (1977);
see supra text accompanying notes 39-40.
119. The district court's award of $50,000 in punitive damages under title VII and section 1981
in Claiborne v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 401 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. La. 1975), was upheld on appeal but
only on the section 1981 grounds. 583 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 442 U.S. 934 (1979).
120. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
121. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975) (emphasis added).
122. Developments in the Law: Employnent Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1109, 1260 (1971) [hereinafter Developments]. At least one court actually
relied on this article as authority for denying damages. See Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Sev-
enth-Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363, 1370 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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available under title VII. The first cases to follow Rogers in adopting the
hostile work environment theory were decided in 1976,123 one year after
the landmark court of appeals decision in Detroit Edison.24 Conse-
quently, only one circuit court initially confronted the title VII damages
issue in the context of a hostile environment cause of action. 25 Interest-
ingly, the Fifth Circuit, which in Rogers was the first to recognize the
hostile work environment theory, was the most reluctant to hold that title
VII does not permit damages awards." 6
Moreover, the majority of the early hostile work environment cases in-
volved race discrimination, 27 and prior to the Supreme Court's recent de-
cision in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 2' section 1981 was availa-
ble as an alternative source of compensatory and punitive damages for
racial harassment.' 29 Consequently, these earlier cases put little pressure
on courts to reconsider the availability of such damages under title VII.
Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit appears to have relied
on the availability of section 1981 as an alternative source of relief when it
first held that compensatory and punitive damages were not available
under title VII.1 3 0 The sexual harassment abusive work environment
cause of action, which has more clearly posed the problem of a right with-
out a remedy, was not recognized until 1981 in Bundy v. Jackson.13'
This gap in timing also demonstrates that Congress' failure to amend
title VII to overturn the courts' wrongfully narrow construction of the
statute was not necessarily due to congressional acquiescence. Rather, the
fact that the courts' interpretation of title VII's relief provisions was not in
conformity with Congress' intent has only recently become apparent. The
failure of the courts to implement the congressional mandate to provide all
"appropriate" relief was not easy to detect as long as title VII plaintiffs
123. See, e.g., Gray v. Greyhound Lines, 545 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
124. EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 431
U.S. 951 (1977). See supra text accompanying notes 37-42.
125. This court was the newly created Eleventh Circuit. By the time it did so, however, virtually
every other circuit had already confronted the issue and decided that compensatory and punitive dam-
ages were unavailable under title VII. The Eleventh Circuit felt compelled to do the same. See
Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355, 1363-64 (11th Cir. 1982).
126. In the race discrimination case of Claiborne v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 401 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D.
La. 1975), modified, 583 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 934 (1979), the lower court
had awarded punitive damages under both title VII and section 1981. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the
award only on the section 1981 grounds, but did so "[wlithout approving or disapproving the lower
court's resolution of the Title VII issue [because] its discussion of Title VII ...is fully persuasive
that an award of punitive damages does not so conflict with the purpose embodied in Title VII ... "
583 F.2d at 154.
127. See, e.g., Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 514-15
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1977).
128. 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
129. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
130. See Shah v. Mt. Zion Hosp. & Medical Center, 642 F.2d 268 (9th Cir. 1981). After devot-
ing little analysis to the title VII issue, the Shah court noted that "[in an appropriate case, compensa-
tory and punitive damages may be available under 42 U.S.C. § 1981." Id. at 272.
131. 641 F.2d 934, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting case of first impression).
1990] 1627
The Yale Law Journal
were obtaining relief for their economic injuries. It was not until plaintiffs
in "pure" hostile work environment cases began to obtain judgments of
liability without the award of any remedies that Congress had a real op-
portunity to observe that title VII has been seriously misconstrued.13 2
III. RESTORING TITLE VII's BROAD REMEDIAL POWERS
The imbalance between rights and remedies provided under title VII
must be redressed by Congress. It is highly unlikely that courts will take
this initiative, since they have summarily denied compensatory and puni-
tive damages under title VII for approximately ten years. As this Note has
argued, however, courts would be fulfilling, not violating, Congress' intent
were they to provide such relief for intangible injuries.
Thus, Congress must amend title VII to provide explicitly for compen-
satory and punitive damages and restore the broad anti-discrimination
powers originally envisioned. Now is the time for Congress to act. Not
only has the full scope of the imbalance between rights and remedies
under title VII only recently manifested itself, but the current political
climate provides a golden opportunity for passing such an amendment.
Indeed, in February, 1990, the Civil Rights Act of 1990 was introduced in
both the House of Representatives and the Senate to restore and improve
the protections against discrimination that have been eroded under a series
of Supreme Court decisions issued in the summer of 19 8 9 .133 The bills
would amend title VII to provide explicitly for compensatory and punitive
damages.13 4 This section is critical for the Act to achieve its stated purpose
of "strengthen[ing] existing protections and remedies available under Fed-
eral civil rights laws to provide more effective deterrence and adequate
compensation for victims of discrimination."'3 5 As the Act gains momen-
tum from the coalition galvanized by the recent detrimental Supreme
Court decisions, Congress should take advantage of this opportunity to
strengthen title VII's remedial provisions.
132. This has only occurred recently since the Supreme Court did not recognize the hostile work
environment cause of action until 1986. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
133. The bills, H.R. 4000, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990),
are identical and were introduced on February 7, 1990. The cases targeted include Patterson v. Mc-
Lean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989), see supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text, and
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989) (increasing burden of proof on plaintiffs
in title VII disparate impact cases).
134. H.R. 4000, supra note 133, § 8; S. 2104, supra note 133, § 8. The House and Senate bills
would both amend section 7 06(g) of title VII by adding the following identical language: "(A) com-
pensatory damages may be awarded; and (B) if the respondent. . . engaged in the unlawful employ-
ment practice with malice, or with reckless or callous indifference to the Federally protected rights of
others, punitive damages may be awarded against such respondent . .. ."
135. H.R. 4000, supra note 133, § 2(b)(2); S. 2104, supra note 133, § 2(b)(2) (identical lan-
guage). Significantly, the second of the two findings included in each bill's "Findings And Purposes"
Section is that "existing protections and remedies under Federal law are not adequate to deter unlaw-
ful discrimination or to compensate victims of such discrimination." H.R. 4000, supra note 133,
§ 2(a)(2); S. 2104, supra note 133, § 2(a)(2) (identical language).
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Congress should understand that such an amendment to title VII would
actually restore the statute's broad remedial powers. As this Note has
demonstrated, the courts, and not Congress, created the imbalance be-
tween rights and remedies under title VII by misinterpreting the statute's
legislative history. Therefore, by invalidating the unduly narrow judicial
construction of title VII's relief provisions, Congress would be reasserting
its 1972 desire that title VII should provide all necessary relief to victims
of employment discriminaton.
The two main stumbling blocks in the path of such reform are the fact
that awarding damages would likely require a right to a jury trial under
title VII, and the political barrier posed by the business community's op-
position to increased costs. Neither of these obstacles is insurmountable.
Awarding compensatory and punitive damages under title VII would
probably trigger the right to a jury trial, 38 since under the Seventh
Amendment, actions for legal remedies, unlike purely equitable actions,
require a jury trial. 1 7 However, the current enforcement mechanisms for
employment discrimination claims can certainly accommodate jury trials.
Jury trials are already available under two other employment discrimina-
tion statutes whose enforcement methods are similar to those under title
VII: the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)"38 and the
Equal Pay Act.'13  Some commentators have contended that jury trials
would be impracticable under title VII since employment discrimination
cases often involve complex and technical questions beyond a jury's com-
petence,1 40 but there is no evidence that juries in ADEA and Equal Pay
Act actions have encountered such difficulties. Similarly, experience under
these statutes refutes the arguments that jury trials under title VII would
cause intolerable delays or wrongfully circumvent the Act's administrative
enforcement procedures. The EEOC administers the ADEA"' and the
136. See, e.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974) (holding that compensatory and punitive
damages under Fair Housing Act are legal remedies requiring right to jury trial). A recent decision by
one Federal district court held that jury trials are currently available under title VII and pointed out
that the Supreme Court has never explicitly decided this issue. Beesley v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 723
F. Supp. 635 (N.D. Ala. 1989).
The authors of the Civil Rights Act of 1990 include in the section granting compensatory and
punitive damages under title VII a provision for jury trials: "If compensatory or punitive damages are
sought with respect to a claim arising under this title, any party may demand a trial by jury." H.R.
4000, %upra note 133, § 8; S. 2104, supra note 133, § 8 (identical language).
137. See D. DOBBS, supra note 34, § 2.6. The distinction between legal and equitable relief
derives from the historic division between courts of law and courts of equity. See id. § 2.1.
138. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982). The ADEA explicitly provides for jury trials. Id. § 626(c)(2).
Jury trials are not available, however, in ADEA actions against the Federal Government. Lehman v.
Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 168-69 (1981).
139. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982). The Equal Pay Act is part of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982). It has been held to permit jury trials. See, e.g., Hodgin v. Jefferson, 447
F. Supp. 804, 809-10 (D. Md. 1978).
140. See, e.g., Developments, supra note 122, at 1264.
141. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (1982).
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Equal Pay Act'" 2 in addition to title VII, and the procedures for process-
ing charges under these three statutes are virtually identical.143
In addition, Congress should not permit the fact that awards of com-
pensatory and punitive damages will impose additional costs on some
businesses to block an amendment to title VII for at least two reasons.
First, although punitive damages awards can be substantial, they would
only be available when the employer's conduct was sufficiently egregious
to meet specified standards."" They should therefore be viewed by em-
ployers as a deterrent, and any employer who takes proper preventive
measures should avoid punitive damages. Secondly, providing for compen-
satory and punitive damages under title VII is not a radical step. Rather,
this would simply bring title VII into conformity with numerous other
causes of action ranging from tort suits to section 1981, which already
hold discriminators accountable for the consequences of their actions. Title
VII was passed with this aim in mind, and it is time to restore the stat-
ute's broad remedial powers to achieve this goal.
IV. CONCLUSION
The hostile work environment cause of action under title VII was pre-
mised on the realization that "today employment discrimination is a far
more complex and pervasive phenomenon, as the nuances and subtleties of
discriminatory employment practices are no longer confined to bread and
butter issues."' 45 Under the current judicial interpretation of title VII,
however, only "bread and butter" harms may be remedied. Whether the
employee has suffered a discriminatory discharge or hostile environment
harassment, no compensatory and punitive damages are available to re-
dress her intangible injuries or to deter future discrimination.
As hostile work environment cases dramatically illustrate, title VII pro-
vides many discrimination victims a right without a remedy. The narrow
judicial interpretation of title VII violates Congress' intent to grant broad
relief to the victims of discrimination. As a result, Congress must now act
to provide for compensatory and punitive damages and thereby restore
title VII's broad remedial powers. As the Supreme Court has declared,
"[w]e must . . . avoid interpretations of Title VII that deprive victims of
discrimination of a remedy."' 46
142. Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1978, 3 C.F.R. § 321 (1978), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1366
(1982).
143. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 938 n.51 (2d ed. 1983).
Title VII, the ADEA, and the Equal Pay Act each provide a private right of action after exhaustion
of administrative remedies. The trials are by jury under the ADEA and .the Equal Pay Act, but are
non-jury under title VII. See id. at 438-42, 487-95, 1058-59.
144. For example, the Civil Rights Act of 1990 would provide a statutory standard to determine
when punitive damages are available, For the statutory language, see supra note 134.
145. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
146. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 178 (1981).
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